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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
arated from his wife, failed to prove in the divorce suit that he
had grounds for separation under Article 138. Of course, if the
parties separated by mutual consent, neither having grounds for
separation under Article 138, then it would appear that fault
would exist as to neither, and alimony should be awarded.
The majority in the instant case found the wife not to be at
fault, but it did not reveal the method used in determining this.
Applying the facts in this case to the suggested approach would
put the wife in the position of proving that when she left her
husband she had legal cause to do so, if she were to receive ali-
mony. Whether or not she would have received the award is
questionable because the court may or may not have considered
the actions of the husband to have been cruelty within the con-
templation of Article 138 (3) ,12 thus giving her a legal cause to
leave. But in any event, by use of this approach there would be
less danger to the stability of marriage which could result from
awarding alimony to an abandoning wife whose husband did not
give her legal cause for divorce or separation. 18
Peyton Moore
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -PREEMPTION OF STATE SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES LAW BY FEDERAL LAW
Defendant was charged with a violation of the Louisiana
Subversive Activities Law' in that she was a member of the
Communist Party, which she knew to be a subversive organiza-
tion. Her motion to quash the bill of information was based, in
part, on the contention that the subject matter of subversive
activities had been preempted by federal legislation. The trial
court sustained the motion. On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme
Court, the state argued that only sedition against the United
States had been preempted and that states could prosecute for
seditious activities against local or state governments. Held,
12. In Adams v. Adams, 196 La. 464, 199 So. 392 (1940), the court did not
decide whether the very acts complained of here would have allowed a separation
on the grounds of cruelty because they were not proved.
13. This does not, however, preclude the danger which could arise from indis-
criminately awarding alimony to the wife who obtains a divorce after a two-year
separation in fact, whether or not she was at fault. But where this situation pre-
sented itself in McKnight v. Irwin, 228 La. 1088, 85 So.2d 1 (1956), the court
inferred that if the wife had claimed alimony, the fault issue would have been
raised, and the award made only if she was not at fault.
1. La. Acts 1954, No. 603, now LA. R.S. 14:366-380 (Supp. 1958).
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affirmed. A charge of subversion through membership in the
Communist Party necessarily includes acts of sedition against
the United States and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal government to prosecute under the Smith Act.2 State v.
Jenkins, 107 So.2d 648 (La. 1958).
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution re-
quires that in conflicts between state and federal laws, the state
law must yield.3 If no clear conflict exists,4 or if Congress has
failed to legislate on the subject,5 it is necessary to determine if
the federal power is exclusive or concurrent. The answer in
each case lies in judicial interpretation of congressional intent.0
If Congress has not expressly indicated its intention, the court
determines that intent according to the nature of the subject
matter. 7 Where the subject matter is national in scope, requiring
uniform regulation," congressional silence has been interpreted
to require exclusive federal jurisdiction. 9 Where the subject
matter is local in nature, not requiring uniform regulation, the
states may exercise control until Congress legislates on the par-
ticular subject involved.'
When Congress enacts a comprehensive scheme of legislation
regulating a particular area of law, the court may regard the
legislation as evidence of an intent to "occupy the field" to the
exclusion of state regulation." Even the interstitial gaps in the
2. 54 STAT. 670 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
3. E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
4. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) ; Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
5. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Halter v. Nebraska, 205
U.S. 34 (1907).




10. See Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) ; Southern Ry. v. Reid,
222 U.S. 424 (1913) ; Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370 (1913) ;
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98 (1895) ; Bowman v. Chi-
cago & Northwestern Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) ; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885) ; County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1880) ;
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) ; Ex parte McNeil, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
236 (1871) ; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
11. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ; Lindgren v. United States,
281 U.S. 38 (1930); International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929);
Oregon-Washington Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926); New
York Central Ry. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) ; Erie Ry. v. New York, 233
U.S. 671 (1914) New York Central & Hudson River Ry. v. Hudson County, 227
U.S. 248 (1913) Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913) ; Second
Employers Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) ; Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washing-
ton, 222 U.S. 370 (1912) ; Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220 (1903) ; Reid v. Colorado.
187 U.S. 137 (1903); People v. Compagnie G~n4rale Transatlantique, 107 U.S.
59 (1882).
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federal scheme are sometimes presumed to be intentional and
state legislation in these areas may be held invalid as an attempt-
ed regulation of that which Congress desired to leave unregulat-
ed.12 If the court finds that Congress intended concurrent juris-
diction, the state laws are valid unless there is an actual con-
flict.13
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 4 the leading case on preemption
in the field of subversive activities, the principal issue was
whether a state could prosecute for subversive activities directed
against the United States.' 5 The court held that the Pennsylvania
sedition statute had been superseded by a comprehensive scheme
of federal legislation. The court found that the congressional
intent in enacting the Smith Act,16 the Internal Security Act,'7
and the Communist Control Act' s was to establish exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction in the regulation of sedition. 9 Since the case,
as reviewed by the court, involved only sedition against the
12. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters' Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Public Service Commission, 250 U.S. 566 (1919) ; Leisy v. Hardin, 135
U.S. 100 (1890). But see International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617 (1958); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) ; Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301 (1949); International Union v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) ; Allen-Bradley Local v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
13. See Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1938) ; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865) ; Wilson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 245 (1829). In Kelly v. Washington, supra at 10, Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes said: "When Congress does exercise its paramount authority, it is obvious
that Congress may determine how far its regulation shall go. There is no con-
stitutional rule which compels Congress to occupy the whole field. Congress may
circumscribe its regulation and occupy only a limited field. When it does so, state
regulation outside that limited field and otherwise admissible is not forbidden or
displaced."
14. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
15. Id. at 499. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, quoted
with approval the language of the lower court: " 'And, while the Pennsylvania
statute proscribes sedition against either the Government of the United States or
the Government of Pennsylvania, it is only alleged sedition against the United
States with which the instant case is concerned. Out of all the voluminous testi-
mony, we have not found, nor has anyone pointed to a single word indicating a
seditious act or even utterance directed against the Government of Pennsylvania.'
He continued: "The precise holding of the court, and all that is before us for
review is that the Smith Act of 1940, as amended in 1948, which prohibits the
knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United States by
force and violence, supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act
which proscribes the same conduct."
16. 54 STAT. 670 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1956).
17. 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1952).
18. 68 STAT. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1956).
19. "We examine these Acts only to determine the congressional plan. Looking
to all of them in the aggregate, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress has
intended to occupy the field of sedition. Taken as a whole they evince a congres-
sional plan which makes it reasonable to determine that no room has been left for
the States to supplement it." 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
NOTES
United States,20 there arose a question of whether a state could
prosecute for Communist activity directed toward state or local
government. Subsequent state court decisions in other juris-
dictions have uniformly held that the states could not conduct
such prosecutions.2
1
In the instant case the state argued that the court should
strictly construe the Nelson opinion.22 Such a construction, it
was contended, would permit state prosecution where communist
activity against the state government, as well as the United
States, was alleged. 23 The Supreme Court, in rejecting this argu-
ment, stated that "communism in any form, even though di-
rected against a local government, necessarily violates the Smith
Act. ' 24 Although the court extended the holding in Nelson to
cover the situation presented, it appears, in view of the language
of Nelson2"1 and the recent decisions in other jurisdictions, that
the court's conclusion in the instant case is correct.
Although the United States Supreme Court in the Nelson
case employed an "occupation of the field" rationale in holding
that state sedition statutes have been superseded, 26 the scope of
the field which has been occupied has not been established con-
clusively. A strong argument may be made that the Nelson case
and the instant case support the contention that all internal
security measures are within the field of law which has been
preempted by federal legislation.27 However, in its operation in
other fields, the preemption doctrine is sometimes selectively
20. See note 15 supra.
21. Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. App. 1956); Common-
wealth v. Gilbert, 334 Mass. 71, 134 N.E.2d 13 (1956) ; Albertson v. Millard, 345
Mich. 519, 77 N.W.2d 104 (1956) ; Commonwealth v. Dolson, 183 Pa. Super. 339,
132 A.2d 692 (1957).
22. 107 So.2d 648, 649 (La. 1958).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. See note 19 supra. "[T]he decision in this case does not affect the right of
States to enforce their sedition laws at times when the Federal Government has
not occupied the field and is not protecting the entire country from seditious con-
duct." (Emphasis added.) 350 U.S. 497, 500 (1956).
26. The court used two other "tests" in reaching its decision, but it clearly
stated, on the strength of the occupation test alone, that state action is precluded.
Id. at 504.
27. The sweeping language of Nelson would appear to support such an argu-
ment. The court defines the "field" that has been occupied by federal legislation
to be the entire area of sedition. Id. at 500. However, since the "congressional
plan" deals primarily with Communist control, it is possible that it may be con-
fined to Communist activities regulated by federal legislation. It is by no means
settled that state prosecutions for seditious activities beyond the scope of the fed-
eral legislation are preempted.
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applied. 28 Unless congressional action is taken,29 it appears likely
that the boundaries of state-federal jurisdiction in the control
of subversion will be established only through the process of
"elucidating litigation."30
Jack Pierce Brook
CRIMINAL LAW - PROSECUTION FOR TWO CRIMES RESULTING
FROM A SINGLE CRIMINAL ACT
Petitioner was convicted of assaulting two federal officers
with a deadly weapon in violation of a federal statute which
prohibited interference with federal officers engaged in official
duties.' Evidence showed that petitioner had wounded the two
28. See, e.g., International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S.
617 (1958); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347
U.S. 656 (1954). In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955),
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "[T]he areas that have been preempted by federal
authority and thereby withdrawn from state power are not susceptible of delimi-
tation by fixed metes and bounds. . . . [T]he Labor Management Relations Act
'leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how
much' . . . . [T]his penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by the
course of litigation." In International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, supra,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "The statutory implications concerning what has
been taken from the states and what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature,
to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidations." 356
U.S. 617, 619.
29. At the time of this writing, 24 bills to reverse the effect of the Nelson
decision are pending congressional action. Typical of these proposed are S. 3
and H.R. 3, which propose to reinstate the jurisdiction of the states in dealing with
control of subversion. The bills further provide that Congress' intent will not be
interpreted as preempting state authority unless that intention is expressly in-
dicated.
30. See note 28 supra. The Nelson case furnishes some indication of the policy
factors which will influence the court in future litigation. "[T]he decision in this
case does not . . . limit the jurisdiction of the States where the Constitution and
Congress have 'specifically given them concurrent jurisdiction . . . [or] limit the
right of the State to protect itself at any time against sabotage or attempted vio-
lence of all kinds. Nor does it prevent the State from prosecuting where the same
act constitutes both a federal offense and a state offense under the police power."
350 U.S. 497, 500.
The majority seemed concerned over the possibility that state sedition statutes,
if allowed to stand, might unjustly deny to defendants the protection of certain
civil liberties. The court specifically mentioned the dangers inherent in a sedition
statute which allows a prosecution to be initiated upon a 'bill of information made
by a private individual. Id. at 507. The court was also concerned by the lack of
protection of "fundamental rights" in several of the state sedition statutes. Id.
at 508. The possibility of double jeopardy problems arising from concurrent prose-
cution was also discussed in the opinion. Id. at 509-10. These indications of the
policy factors to be considered by the court seem to compel the conclusion that
state prosecutions initiated as "elucidating litigation" must contain adequate safe-
guards for civil liberties. Cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 27 U.S.L.W. 4233 (1959).
. 1. Former 18 U.S.C. § 254 (1940) provided: "Whoever shall forcibly resist,
oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with any person [a federal officer] desig-
nated in section 253 . . . while engaged in the performance of his official duties,
